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			15 Ma	ay 1964			
MEMORANDUN	1 FOR: C	Committee (	on Overhead	Reconnaissa	ance		
SUBJECT:	S	anitization	of the KH-7	Product			•
raised at COMO look at a draft proposed to try COMOR.	OR on 14 M reported the memorandu and accele	ay, as you at the Work am next We erate proce	ting Group wondersday, 20 ssing for directory	oer. At that as expecting May, and he ect referral on on this so	time g to e l to		
is attached and	l will be con	asidered at	COMOR on	21 May.			25X1
		Committee	Chairma on Overhead	n l Reconnaiss	sance	COMPANY OF THE PERSON OF THE P	
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COMOR-D-7/23 (CDG&S-D-19)

MEMORANDUM FOR:

Chairman

Committee on Overhead Reconnaissance

SUBJECT:

Sanitization of the KH-7 Product

1. The CDG&S Working Group recommends that COMOR give immediate attention to the need for writing interim regulations designed to control sanitization and use of the KH-7 product.

- 2. The problem is introduced at this time because in certain areas KH-7 has produced valuable information which is beyond the capability of KH-4. As an example, there is an obvious need, for ROB purposes, to pinpoint and identify such air defense

  This requirement has been met by the KH-7. It is the opinion of the Working Group that means must be devised for making such information available out of the system, but at the same time it is essential that all aspects of a decision to do this be recognized. Any broad authority to include KH-7 under the terms of the present annexes to COMOR-D-7/1 could well escalate and create a serious security problem.
- 3. The Working Group Report, which was distributed by COMOR under COMOR-D-7/22, addresses itself to the problem of protecting the precise capability of our photographic satellites cast in the perspective of what can be deduced by the opposition from an examination of products now being produced within the terms of the existing Sanitization Manual and its annexes. A consideration taken

extent of our success in addition to the qualitative. However, with regard to quality serious doubts arise when the question is posed on the inclusion of material derived from KH-7, the primary objective of which is to produce technical intelligence. It is the consensus of the Working Group that sanitized products designed to assist targeting and military planning should be restricted to strategic intelligence and

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	COMOR-D-7/23
	(CDG&S-D-19)
should not permit a deduction that technical intelligence or even to resolution than that presently ind	procure photography of a better
4. Recommendation: that:	The Working Group recommends
a. There be a against sanitization of the the terms of COMOR-D-7. This prohibits use of KH-targeting products including	7/1, Annexes B and C. -7 derived material in
b. Any immedin a sanitized form be conformed of an individual report with accordance with Annex	ith a fictitious source,
c. For the tir requests be referred to C	me being all such COMOR for approval.
d. COMOR apgroup to draw up interim designed fully to protect	
	Chairman CDG&SWG